For my master’s program in international relations, I’m currently taking a seminar course where we, as a class, discuss democratic transitions. The first few classes involved finding a definition of democracy and then considering the different means by which it develops. Each of us must, during one class period, lead a 20-minute review and discussion of an assigned reading.
My assigned reading is from a new, distinct portion of the class in which we are discussing democracy in specific regional contexts. The article,“Confucianism and Democracy” by Francis Fukuyama considers democracy in East Asia, where Confucianism is a dominant religious philosophy. You might recognize Fukuyama’s name from his famous (at least in policy circles) 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, in which he theorized that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism would be the endpoint of political development.
In the piece at hand, Fukuyama discusses whether allegedly “Confucian values” such as hierarchy, social cohesion, and respect for authority can coexist with democratic principles like individual rights and political participation. Fukuyama approaches this question by exploring the political trajectories of East Asian countries that have long embraced Confucian traditions, using modernization theory to argue that economic development can lead to democratization even in Confucian societies.
I found this topic fascinating since my first foray into foreign affairs occurred via the book “On China” by Henry Kissinger, which included a comprehensive view of foreign affairs and politics from the Chinese point of view. I was a nerd at 17, and read portions of the book twice. China, and East Asia broadly, are culturally very distinct and developed mostly independently from the West until just over a century ago.
Fukuyama’s thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that Confucianism is inherently undemocratic. Instead, he presents a nuanced view of the relationship between Confucian values and democracy, suggesting that Confucianism may not be a barrier to democratization but could instead shape a unique form of political liberalization distinct from the Western model. As East Asia continues to evolve both economically and politically, the lessons from this exploration are essential for understanding how cultural values interact with governance in a globalized world.
Modernization Theory and East Asia
Modernization theory argues that economic development leads to political liberalization and stable democratic institutions. Fukuyama applies this theory to East Asia, highlighting Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as case studies where rapid economic growth has been followed by political liberalization. For these countries, economic modernization created the conditions that made democracy possible, despite their Confucian cultural roots.
Take Japan, for example. After World War II, under U.S. occupation, Japan adopted a democratic constitution. Initially, many scholars doubted whether democracy could take root in Japan due to its hierarchical and authoritarian traditions rooted in Confucian values. However, Japan’s postwar economic boom allowed it to build democratic institutions that proved to be sustainable, even in the face of its Confucian heritage. Similarly, South Korea and Taiwan, once authoritarian regimes, transitioned to democracy as their economies developed, providing further support for the idea that modernization fosters democratization.
Fukuyama points out that the relationship between economic development and democracy is not simply a matter of adopting Western political systems. Rather, modernization opens the door to new social demands, particularly the demand for "recognition"—the need to be treated with dignity and have a say in governance. This is a universal human desire, not limited to Western cultures. In this sense, modernization doesn’t impose democracy on Confucian societies, but it encourages the pursuit of political participation in ways that may be unique to their cultural context.
A Critique of Cultural Relativism
A significant challenge to modernization theory is the critique of cultural relativism, which argues that applying Western standards of democracy to non-Western societies overlooks the importance of cultural context. Confucian societies, critics argue, prioritize social harmony, respect for authority, and collective well-being over individual rights, making them inherently undemocratic.
Fukuyama counters this argument by highlighting the universality of the desire for recognition. While Confucian values may emphasize hierarchy and social order, they do not negate the possibility of political participation. For example, Confucianism values meritocracy, which promotes social mobility based on individual achievement. This aligns with democratic principles of fairness and equality. Additionally, Confucianism places a high value on education, which is critical for an informed and engaged citizenry—a cornerstone of democracy.
Fukuyama suggests that while the form democracy takes in Confucian societies may differ from Western models, the underlying principles of political participation and accountability can still emerge as these societies modernize. The pursuit of recognition, which is awakened by economic progress, transcends cultural boundaries and pushes Confucian societies toward political liberalization.
Confucian Values and Democracy
One of the key insights from Fukuyama’s article is his examination of specific Confucian values that could be compatible with democracy. Meritocracy, for instance, has long been a central tenet of Confucianism. In traditional China, the Confucian examination system was designed to identify and elevate individuals based on their abilities rather than their social class. While this system was hierarchical, it promoted a sense of fairness and upward mobility, which resonates with democratic ideals of equal opportunity.
Education is another area where Confucian values align with democracy. Confucianism places a strong emphasis on education as a moral duty and a path to self-improvement. In a democratic society, an educated populace is essential for informed political participation, and the emphasis on education in Confucian societies supports the development of such a populace.
Moreover, Confucianism has historically tolerated other religions and belief systems, including Buddhism and Christianity. This suggests a capacity for pluralism, which is crucial for democratic governance. Although Confucianism emphasizes social order, it does not necessarily conflict with the pluralistic and deliberative nature of democracy.
Comparing China and Japan
Fukuyama also delves into the differences between Chinese and Japanese interpretations of Confucianism and their respective political outcomes. In China, Confucianism has traditionally emphasized loyalty to the family over the state, creating a society where family bonds are strong, but trust between unrelated individuals is relatively weak. This “familism” has made it difficult for China to develop the kind of social cohesion necessary for stable democratic institutions. Political authority is often viewed with suspicion, and this lack of trust in the state has contributed to political instability.
In contrast, Japanese Confucianism places a greater emphasis on loyalty to the state. The family, while important, is seen as subordinate to national obligations. This state-oriented version of Confucianism has fostered a stronger sense of national identity and social cohesion in Japan, making it easier for democratic institutions to take root. Fukuyama’s comparison underscores that Confucianism is not a monolithic philosophy—it can adapt to different cultural and political contexts with varying outcomes for democracy.
Authoritarianism in Confucian Societies
Fukuyama also addresses the prevalence of authoritarianism in some Confucian societies, particularly Singapore. Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore developed a model of "soft" authoritarianism, which combined a capitalist economy with strict political control. Lee argued that Confucian values of social harmony and respect for authority made Western-style democracy unsuitable for Singapore.
Fukuyama critiques this view, suggesting that regimes like Singapore’s use Confucianism to justify political repression. He argues that as these societies become wealthier and better educated, they will demand greater political freedoms—not because of Western influence, but as a natural consequence of their internal development. Fukuyama remains skeptical of broad generalizations that equate Confucianism with authoritarianism, pointing out that other Confucian societies like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have embraced democracy while maintaining elements of their traditional values.
Conclusion
Fukuyama challenges the simplistic notion that Confucianism is inherently incompatible with democracy. He argues that as Confucian societies modernize, they are likely to develop democratic institutions reflecting their cultural values while embracing political participation and accountability. The key to understanding this relationship lies in modernization theory, which suggests that economic development creates the conditions for political liberalization, even in societies with deep-rooted hierarchical traditions.
Ultimately, Fukuyama encourages us to view Confucianism not as an obstacle to democracy, but as a cultural framework that could shape unique forms of democratic governance. As East Asian societies evolve, they may offer new models of democracy that balance individual freedoms with collective responsibilities, providing a fresh perspective on what it means to govern in a globalized world.