Considering Israel and Ukraine
Why does America treat them differently?
This week, Iranian drones were launched as part of a military attack. This happened in two places: Israel and Ukraine. Iranian-manufactured Shahed drones were used by Iran to attack Israel in apparent retaliation for an Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus last week. The same model of drone, supplied by Iran to the Russian military, has been used in swarms to attack Ukraine.
The drone attack by Iran was part of a tactic developed by the Russians in Ukraine to overwhelm missile defense systems with cheap, expendable drones to facilitate a successful missile attack. The Russians have been able to do this with impunity, but not the Iranians. A coalition of the U.S., U.K., and, interestingly, the Arab states of Jordan and Saudi Arabia intercepted both the drones and the missiles.
Why would Jordan and Saudi Arabia defend Israel from an attack? There are several, each deserving of their own essay, and they include:
1. They want to normalize ties with Israel.
2. It’s part of a long-running regional power struggle between Sunni Arab and Shia states
3. A war with Iran and Israel prolongs the Israel-Palestine conflict
But, the immediate perception in Ukraine was that this coalition of the willing was being hypocritical by defending Israel from an attack that Ukraine experiences regularly. On the surface, this seems true and is completely understandable from the Ukrainian perspective.
They are facing down a major military power (demonstrably no longer a superpower) with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and have to beg the United States for weapons to defend Ukraine’s borders (and U.S. interests). Their stock of ammunition for missile defense systems is running low, and they are on the defensive along the 1200km front. Not only deprived of long-range weaponry to fight on a level battlefield, they are still being lectured on how to use the weapons they do have.
This reticence by the United States may seem confounding, but the reason starts with “nuclear” and ends with “weapons”. Russia may have a smaller GDP than California, but it hosts the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. This arsenal, like other nuclear arsenals, can be divided into “tactical” and “strategic”. The distinction is somewhat arbitrary, and it accounts at the same time for both the size of the weapons (i.e. yield) and their use.
A “tactical” nuclear weapon is on the order of 50 kilotons (kt) or less and, generally speaking, is used to create a tactical advantage on the battlefield or in a theater of war. However, these are not small weapons; the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was around 18 kt. Their preemptive use by Russia would still be devastating and would prompt an overwhelming conventional response by the United States.
A “strategic” nuclear weapon is much larger, and its yield is often measured in megatons (or 1000 kt). These weapons have never been used in warfare and are much more destructive than the bombs dropped on Japan to end World War II. Their use is essentially as a hostage taker; their ability to destroy cities and kill millions of people raises the stakes of an attack so high that there is no conceivable benefit worth the potential cost.
Russia has repeatedly bluffed about its “red lines” that would possibly result in a response with a tactical nuclear weapon. And, in 2020, Putin announced a change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine to allow for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response to conventional attacks in certain scenarios. Many of those redlines have been crossed with no response, such as Ukrainian attacks on Crimea last year and the continued attacks on the Russian fleet that unilaterally reopened Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.
But, one of the basic ideas of nuclear deterrence is that the terrible destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that even a minuscule chance of their use engenders caution. This explains both why Putin’s threats are so outrageous and why they have worked. President Biden, whose political career began in the middle of the Cold War, has been very cautious by gradually supplying weapons to Ukraine as Russia’s bluffs have been called.
This cautious approach (some would argue a self-deterring one) is why the administration continues to caution Ukraine on striking infrastructure in Russian territory and why it refuses to directly engage American military assets to defend Ukraine. Then, if Ukrainian action does trigger a Russian nuclear response, the U.S. will have its hands clean and be able to manage the escalation ladder and prevent a wider nuclear war.
Full Ukrainian victory will require taking this risk. If Ukraine can’t demonstrate the same conventional capabilities as the Russians and drive up the cost for Russia of continuing the war, it cannot negotiate for a return of its territory. The result is what we saw before aid to Ukraine was delayed by House Speaker Mike Johnson: a military stalemate where Ukraine will be compelled to trade land for peace.
Nuclear chicken is not a game for the faint of heart. The relationship between Israel and Iran has this same dynamic but in reverse. Iran does not have a nuclear arsenal, and Israel has signaled it does (though never officially acknowledged). Since Iran does not have nukes, Israel’s allies are not that cautious about engaging their military assets directly. Israel’s nuclear strategy is different than Russia’s. It relies on strategic ambiguity with no discussion of red lines or confirmation the weapons even exist.
And yet, Iran is still cautious. No significant damage occurred from its recent attack and Iran has already declared it a victory. Israel is indicating it may attack again. The lesson that unfortunately may be drawn from this by states around the world is that it pays to have nuclear weapons. Ukraine almost certainly looks back with regret for turning over the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union thirty years ago.
It also signals to American allies that if they come under attack by a nuclear power, previous statements and guarantees from the U.S. government might not be worth much. This will likely only embolden Russia, which has fewer qualms about civilian life, to push the issue further and try to take back the former Soviet Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The long-term result of not helping Ukraine to full victory could be a more dangerous world than if we took the risk now to stand up to Russia.
Or, the administration could be right and we avoid a nuclear conflict with minimal impact on the strategic position of the United States and Russia stops with the land traded for peace. I’m partial to the former option, but these are tough decisions being made by intelligent, experienced people. I just hope they are accounting for the future risks their current caution could lead to.