The Endgame of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
I can’t think of a greater display of national bravery and patriotism in recent history than what Ukraine has done in the last two weeks. But despite the obvious bravery and heroism of the Ukrainian people, the sooner this war is over the better. But what would the endgame look like?
First, let’s take a look at Russia’s initial demand for security guarantees. Some are reasonable, but some appeared to be non-starters designed to sabotage negotiations. The list was as follows:
No strengthening of NATO‘s security at the expense of Russia’s security
The use of multilateral consultations and the NATO-Russia Council to address points of conflict
Reaffirmation that NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries and maintain a dialogue
No military deployment on the territory of any of the other states in Europe in addition to any forces that were deployed as of May 27, 1997
No deployment of land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles adjacent to the other parties
No further enlargement of NATO
NATO members shall not conduct any military activity in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, or in Central Asia
No agreement shall supersede the role of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security.
Points 2, 3, 5, and 8 are reasonable and designed to minimize the threat Russia and NATO feel from each other without compromising their security needs. The other four are an unrealistic Russian wish list from a country that still has not accepted the loss of its empire.
Point 1 is intentionally vague and can be conveniently defined by Russia to mean anything it wants. Point 4 would prevent NATO from participating in essential activities to protect its Eastern European members. Point 6 undermines NATO’s open-door policy and ensures that none of Russia’s neighbors can enter an alliance to protect themselves from Russian interests. Point 7 reinforces this, by tacitly admitting that the only country that can have legitimate security interests in these regions is Russia.
This would amount to rolling back the post-Soviet space to the arrangement following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, with the possibility that Russia could more blatantly interfere with these countries’ politics while the NATO alliance is powerless to prevent it.
With these demands, Putin essentially gave away the plot to prepare the world for his attempt to reestablish Russian dominance in the former Second World.
He also appears to intend to coerce countries and bluff NATO with nuclear threats to accomplish this goal. There can be no negotiations with Putin on these points, only coercion until the pain of staying on this course outweighs the benefits.
Regime change may be necessary to accomplish this. But the good thing about the punitive sanctions is, that regardless of the actual policy of the Russian government, it will grind the Russian war machine to a halt. There is no negotiation or persuasion involved there, just the simple fact that equipment cannot be manufactured and the army can not be paid.
So regardless of what else happens, Russia will fail at its maximalist goal of conquering Ukraine. In the long term, it will also fail to hold any new Ukrainian territory, or even maintain its hold on Crimea or the Donbas.
What incentive could Ukraine possibly have to negotiate? There is none beyond relieving Ukrainians under siege in cities such as Mariupol, Sumy, and Chernikiv, and ending the terror of Ukrainian citizens subject to bombardment. Given the likelihood of Ukrainian victory and the national pride that they have forged through this ordeal, its baseline demand will likely be a full guarantee of the inviolability of its borders and the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory.
In the immediate term, barring regime change, Ukraine would have to offer Russia some semblance of a win. With the crippling of the Russian army imminent, Ukraine’s demonstrated ability to defend itself, and the West’s demonstration of support in the form of sanctions and weapons, NATO membership would be an unnecessary formality. Some guarantee of neutrality on the part of Ukraine would be a reasonable way to allow Putin to claim victory in stopping Western encroachment, without substantively harming Ukraine’s independence in any way.
A crippled Russia is no threat to a battle-hardened and armed Ukraine and there are ways around NATO neutrality to provide a nuclear deterrent that prevents even the possibility of a repeat Russian invasion. For example, Ukraine could proceed with EU membership and then join its security pact. France has nuclear weapons, so this would give Ukraine a deterrent without encouraging proliferation.
Long-term, providing economic assistance to a crippled Russia, likely without Putin, while strictly limiting its military activities as was done with post-war Germany, offers the best path to properly integrating Russia into Europe. A focus on integrating the post-Soviet space via the European Union rather than NATO will help with this integration, as it was the expansion of an American-led security alliance that did much to lead to our current crisis.
So, in summary, this conflict will end soon as Ukraine repels the invasion of a weakened Russia and offers a promise of neutrality concerning NATO in exchange for full recognition of its borders before the annexation of Crimea. Long-term, future conflict will be prevented by welcoming Ukraine into the EU within a robust security pact amongst EU members, and the proper integration of a crippled Russian state into Europe. Sanctions can be lifted gradually as Russia meets certain requirements to prevent it from re-emerging as a security threat.
The suffering of the Ukrainian people through this crisis should not be forgotten and is a stark warning to future generations of the utter senselessness of war in the pursuit of any objective but self-defense. But, if world leaders can play this situation correctly, we can emerge with a stronger security order in Europe and the final end of the Soviet Empire.