Why Afghanistan and Ukraine are Different
The US was right to leave Afghanistan, but would be wrong to abandon Ukraine
The political debate on foreign policy in America is very simplistic. On one side you often hear that if American leadership was “stronger”, then a large number of global crises would be avoided. On the other side, you may hear that the US is too involved in the world and that our interventions create most of the global crises we deal with.
Both of these points involve a central conceit: that the United States is singularly responsible for either solving or causing most of the problems in the world.
This is simply not true. Moreover, these approaches deny the agency of the other 192 independent nations on Earth in favor of a fundamentally US-centric worldview. Foreign policy can not be made based on ideas that are disconnected with reality.
But what is the reality of the world as it relates to the conduct of foreign policy?
Well, the United States has interests, some worth defending with force, some not. And the same is true for any other country, including Ukraine, Afghanistan, and even Russia.
However, as the world’s only superpower and its dominant military and economic force, it has interests that other nations do not. One of those is upholding a rules-based international order that has prevented a major war between great powers for 70 years and kept global markets open and shipping lanes free.
Other interests are more mundane. America needs to protect its citizens at home and abroad and maintain a position of strength and deterrence to do so. It also needs to be able to fulfill its commitments to different alliances and prove it is a reliable partner.
It’s easy to make the case that just about anything, theoretically, falls under the umbrella of US interests, but that doesn’t account for constraints such as how much money we can spend on our military, where we should devote time and attention for diplomatic efforts, and also the right of other nations to pursue their interests even where they might conflict with those of the United States.
This requires discernment between peripheral and vital interests.
What was our interest in Afghanistan?
On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda terrorists harbored by the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan attacked the United States using four hijacked planes. In response, the United States issued an ultimatum to the Taliban to surrender Osama-bin-Laden or face an invasion. The Taliban refused, and the rest is history.
Our interest was clear: retaliating against a government that enabled an attack on the United States to deter future attacks. The required means was just as clear: attacking the Afghan government with overwhelming force and leaving with the point having been made.
But that’s not what happened. Instead, we tried to rebuild an entire nation from the ground up. We had a failure to recognize that, while a nice thing to do, building a democratic, centralized government where none had ever existed was (1) not within the capabilities of our government with the resources available at the time and (2) not a vital interest of the United States.
Afghanistan has never been a unified nation in the sense that we understand it in the United States. It was at best a confederation of tribes loosely organized into coalitions such as the Taliban. Any change of government was simply a changing coalition of tribes, with winners and losers. This meant an insurgency that would never end as long as a foreign occupier was there.
Fixing that would have required a full-scale occupation similar to what Japan and Germany experienced post-WWII. Even here, Washington grudgingly admitted these limitations and the limited interest it had in Afghanistan, by not pursuing this course. Even so, due to a combination of political pressure and economic incentives, we drained two trillion dollars and endless amounts of attention in a doomed “nation-building” exercise.
And yet, with a Taliban that had learned its lesson, what conceivable threat could Afghanistan pose to the United States? It is no threat to the international order, has very little economic clout, and is surrounded by powerful neighbors such as India, China, and Pakistan that have an interest in maintaining stability in that country.
So no interest of the US was served by us being there. The only interests were those of a distracted foreign policy and military establishment that should have had other priorities.
And while withdrawal from Afghanistan may have signaled “weakness”, it had no tangible impact on the power of the United States in the world and freed up resources so the US could be more impactful in other regions where it had more vital interests.
What is our interest in Ukraine?
At the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, the US strode the world as the most powerful nation to ever exist, with no other nation even comparable. This led to a feeling of inevitability that we could reshape the world in our image and there was no limitation on US power. This led to neglect of areas of importance, such as East Asia where China was rising, and the boundary between NATO and the former Soviet sphere, where a revisionist Russia was waiting for a chance to reverse the outcome of the Cold War.
Any challenges to the US-led world order here could have historical implications and plunge a world at relative peace back into the violence that characterized the early 20th century.
One challenge is more acute than any other right now, and that is Russia’s challenge to the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has been clear in his own words that, if he could, he would expel US influence from Europe, break up NATO, and reinstitute spheres of influence as the organizing principle of global politics.
Putin believes it is in his country’s interest to remove the United States from its position of guarantor of the world order, and he seems prepared to use all means at his disposal to do this, inncluding overturning the principles of the world order itself.
His view is understandable, given the historic tension between the United States and Russia, and the fact that Russia fell from being a superpower without firing a shot. But, understandable or not, his goal could have disastrous consequences, and he can not be allowed to achieve it.
What will stop Russia? Only one thing: making the costs of an invasion greater than the benefits, and that is accomplished by ensuring Ukraine is armed and ready to make an invasion as painful to Russia’s leadership as possible. It is also accomplished by levying the most serious sanctions possible on Russia’s leadership.
Why not position our troops to fight Russia directly? Well, Russia has nuclear weapons and will be tempted to throw its arsenal in the mix if another nuclear power invades. It also undermines the perception of the conflict as induced by Russia, meaning a final political settlement might be less favorable to the West. Also, as a principle of international law, it’s generally not appropriate to intervene militarily unless directly attacked. It makes no sense to attempt to uphold the international order by defying it.
That is part of why the United States’ frequent foreign interventions in the Middle East over the last two decades are problematic.
So, on balance, we should support Ukraine by arming it and providing support wherever possible, without direct military intervention. We should also make it clear, in coordination with NATO, that no political settlement will be possible unless Russia agrees to withdraw all troops currently occupying portions of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. And we should make it clear that NATO will not accept a veto by Russia over its actions.
Draw a line, establish a deterrent, and make clear that attempting to overthrow the current security arrangement in Europe will be more painful than it is worth.
How we deal with a “great power” imposing its will on another country will have global reverberations. China will start looking more aggressively at Taiwan. Other countries will see this and start playing the same game. And the world could potentially be on a path right into WWIII.
And that’s a far greater concern than the system of government in Afghanistan.