Trump's Ukraine Reversal
A Geopolitical Earthquake with Lasting Consequences
Donald Trump has dramatically altered America’s stance on Ukraine, leaving Europe struggling to keep up. His proposal for rights to half of Ukraine's mineral wealth and his antagonism toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, signal a fundamental shift in U.S. policy.
This week, the United States held meetings with Russia on the war in Ukraine without Ukraine. President Zelensky protested, Trump accused Ukraine of starting the war and then attacked Zelensky as an unpopular dictator on Truth Social. Even Congressional Republicans protested this characterization.
This shift potentially aligns Washington more closely with an emerging axis of revisionist authoritarian states, diverging from its historical role as a defender of European security and democracy. Rather than defending a rules-based order that assumes equal rights for independent states, the Trump administration appears to be pursuing a policy of maximizing America’s sphere of influence.
Given the significant consequences of this trajectory, policymakers must reassess their approach to the war in Ukraine and broader transatlantic security.
Russia’s Maximalist Goals and Ukraine’s Resistance
Vladimir Putin’s strategic ambitions have remained clear: the restoration of Russian influence over the post-Soviet space and the weakening of NATO. In his pursuit of these goals, he miscalculated Ukraine's resilience.
Russia initially sought a rapid conquest but was met with fierce resistance. As analysts have noted, Ukraine’s continued defiance has proven that Russia’s military is incapable of achieving its maximalist objectives without unacceptable losses.
At this stage, Ukraine is right to hold out for complete Russian withdrawal and formal security guarantees as a starting position, rather than accepting a deal that could leave it vulnerable to future aggression.
Beyond mere military miscalculations, Russia’s economic and diplomatic positioning has suffered. Sanctions imposed by Western nations have significantly reduced Russian access to financial markets and technology.
The loss of European energy markets has forced Moscow to pivot toward China and India, but these partners demand significant discounts on Russian oil and gas, limiting the Kremlin’s economic options. Meanwhile, Russian military logistics have been further strained by international embargoes on semiconductors and other high-tech components.
The battlefield itself has exposed deep flaws in Russia’s command structure. The failures in troop mobilization, outdated and slowly adapted tactics, and poor supply chain management have contributed to Ukraine’s successes in stopping Russian advances.
Moscow’s reliance on mercenaries like the Wagner Group and foreign troops from North Korea and Syria underscores its personnel shortages. Russia has increased the size of its army in recent months,
Given these setbacks, Ukraine has a credible case for pressing forward rather than seeking premature negotiations that favor Russian interests.
The Nuclear Factor and U.S. Self-Deterrence
One of the enduring myths surrounding U.S. reluctance to escalate support for Ukraine is the fear of nuclear confrontation. However, history suggests that Russia's nuclear threats are largely bluffs designed to deter Western intervention.
Ukraine’s de facto NATO support, including intelligence sharing, weapons supplies, and economic support, has not triggered nuclear escalation. Even Ukraine's invasion of Russian territory in the Kursk region has failed to provoke the kind of retaliatory response that many feared.
Russia’s nuclear doctrine, while aggressive in its rhetoric, has maintained strategic constraints. The cost of nuclear escalation for Moscow would be catastrophic, leading to severe international isolation and conventional retaliatory strikes by NATO forces.
Analysts argue that Putin leverages nuclear threats primarily for psychological warfare rather than as a genuine tactical option. Consequently, self-deterrence from the West serves only to embolden Russian aggression. It also undermines nuclear proliferation efforts, as smaller countries seek their own arsenals to deter aggression by nuclear powers.
The idea that NATO membership would have provoked war ignores the reality that Russia has already chosen aggression against its non-member neighbors in Europe. Georgia and Ukraine both have 20% of their territory occupied by Russia, the breakaway Transnistria region of Moldova hosts Russian forces, and Belarus has been effectively annexed.
The Broken Promise of the Budapest Memorandum
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a newly independent Ukraine found itself with a third of the Soviet’s nuclear capabilities on its territory. It had the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, which included:
1,900 strategic nuclear warheads
2,500 tactical nuclear weapons
220 strategic delivery systems, including 130 SS-19 ICBMs, 46 SS-24 ICBMs, and 176 missile silos
44 strategic bombers
Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine surrendered all its nuclear warheads in exchange for security assurances from the U.S., U.K., and Russia. The estimated value of what Ukraine gave up was approximately $183 billion in military assets.
Technically, Ukraine did not have operational control of these weapons. The “nuclear button” had been passed from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to newly minted Russian president Boris Yeltsin (Putin’s predecessor). However, Ukraine retained significant technical resources, and the presence of these weapons stockpiles was a powerful deterrent.
In the wake of the immediate collapse of the Soviet Union, American priorities in the post-Soviet world were preventing an immediate conflict and preventing nuclear proliferation and “loose nukes”. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan all inherited arsenals, and there was a risk Russia would resort to military means to collect this hardware.
The Budapest Memorandum was designed to prevent this in the short term. The long-term risk that Russia might seek to reconquer these countries was accounted for through security assurances which, on paper, provided the needed deterrence for future conflict.
However, when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, these assurances proved meaningless. The lesson for Kyiv is clear: security comes not from paper guarantees but from concrete military capability and alliances. This reinforces Ukraine’s drive for NATO and EU integration, despite Moscow's protests.
The Myth of "Unfair Burdens"
A common refrain in U.S. political discourse is that Europe is not contributing enough to Ukraine's defense. However, the data does not support this claim. The U.S. has allocated $183 billion to Ukraine, with an additional $50 billion in loan guarantees, while Europe has provided over 60% of non-military financial assistance.
The gap in military aid between the U.S. and Europe is only $2 billion. Given that the U.S. and the EU have comparable GDPs, European allies are pulling their weight. If America withdraws, Europe will have no choice but to fill the vacuum, possibly by deploying their own forces directly in Ukraine. Most of these countries are NATO allies, so this would raise the escalation risk for the United States.
The total military aid provided to Ukraine by the U.S. includes:
$66 billion in military equipment and direct aid
Advanced air defense systems such as Patriot missiles
Long-range precision artillery like HIMARS
Anti-tank weapons such as Javelins and ATGMs
Tactical drones and surveillance technology
An accounting of U.S. spending on Ukraine can be found here.
The European Union has provided over $90 billion in financial and humanitarian assistance, as well as direct arms supplies from Germany, France, Poland, and the U.K. The EU’s commitment to a long-term support package, worth an additional $54 billion, indicates Europe’s recognition that Ukraine’s fight is central to its own security.
What this suggests is the leverage of the United States might not be as high as the Trump administration thinks. Enhanced security assistance by Europe, and Russia’s declining economic fortunes, raise the possibility that the current stalemate could be maintained without American involvement.
It would be a risky move, but one that is tempting to Ukraine, which is in an existential fight. It might tempt Europe as well. The UK, France, and Germany have raised the possibility of sending in troops, and Turkey has supported Ukraine’s full territorial integrity, including Crimea. Zelensky has said that Ukraine would last only six months without American support, but this assumes European support would be static.
The Cost of American Retreat
If Trump follows through on his threats to abandon Ukraine, the consequences will be severe. Russia will interpret U.S. disengagement as a green light for further aggression, potentially targeting Moldova, the Baltic states, or even broader destabilization efforts across Europe.
This would force NATO into a more direct confrontation, increasing the risk of a much larger war. Meanwhile, China will view the abandonment of Ukraine as a signal that the U.S. may not defend Taiwan and its other East Asian allies (whom we have no collective security arrangement with). This would embolden its regional ambitions and risk further escalation. Far from promoting peace, an American retreat in a critical theater could set the stage for broader global conflict.
Additionally, the economic impact of abandoning Ukraine should not be overlooked. A Russian victory or prolonged war of attrition would further destabilize global energy markets and drive up inflation.
Supply chain disruptions from Ukraine’s agricultural and industrial sectors would ripple across Europe, Asia, and North America. If Russia perceives a weakened U.S. commitment to global stability, it could encourage further economic warfare tactics, such as leveraging energy supplies for political concessions.
Peace Without Capitulation
At the onset of the war, Russia issued a list of maximalist demands that included several non-starters, which I described as follows:
“This would amount to rolling back the post-Soviet space to the arrangement following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, with the possibility that Russia could more blatantly interfere with these countries’ politics while the NATO alliance is powerless to prevent it.”
Russia’s military performance in Ukraine undermined its claims to those demands. But Putin’s calculations were based on something more than raw military prowess. As I explained in a previous piece, Putin, if taken at face value, thinks in historical terms in contrast to the more technocratic, analytical framework familiar to most Americans.
Based on his desire to reunite the Russian civilization rent asunder by the sudden fall of the Soviet Union, he was determined to take Ukraine when the chance presented itself, or when the chance of losing Ukraine to European integration was high.
He was also betting on Western disunity ultimately failing Ukraine. The network of right-wing nationalist parties across the US and Europe represented Putin’s hope to leverage the domestic politics of his adversaries to his advantage. To an extent, this appears to have worked, at least in the United States.
In this context, Russia would likely treat a peace deal as an opportunity to rearm and try again later. Considering this fact, any peace deal that will work in the long-term will need to deter Russia and not rely on the goodwill and assurances of Vladmir Putin.
Rather than seeking an ill-advised "deal" with Russia that undermines Ukrainian sovereignty, approach should recognize the interests of multiple stakeholders beyond the United States and Russia. It requires asking what would give Russia a face-saving out, and what would allow Ukraine to lay down arms without fear, even if it must trade land for peace.
Security Guarantees: A formalized European security pact for Ukraine that deters further Russian aggression without requiring immediate NATO membership.
EU Integration: Ukraine’s membership in the European Union would provide economic and political stability, reinforcing its sovereignty.
Targeted Sanctions Relief for Russian De-escalation: Moscow should only receive economic incentives if it verifiably ceases hybrid warfare tactics and military provocations.
Long-term Military Deterrence: Continued military aid to Ukraine ensures that Russia understands further invasions will be met with overwhelming resistance.
Strategic Economic Partnerships: Western nations should invest in Ukraine’s defense-industrial complex to make it more self-sufficient, reducing its reliance on external aid.
The result would be an independent Ukraine with a substantial self-defense capability and European security guarantees not subject to the whims of the American electorate, and a Russia without any prospect of conquering its neighbor, even if it would like to.
Conclusion
Trump’s abrupt shift in Ukraine policy is not just a deviation from past U.S. commitments; it is a geopolitical gamble with potentially catastrophic consequences. If Washington signals weakness, Russia and China will exploit it, leading to greater global instability. Instead of capitulating to authoritarian pressure to get a quick deal, the U.S. and its allies must reinforce Ukraine’s sovereignty and ensure that Russia’s aggression is met with steadfast resistance. The alternative is a world where autocracies fight over spheres of influence and leave everyone else to fend for themselves.